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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CCW RANCH, LLC, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
CHRIS NIELSEN and 
SUNNY J. NIELSEN, 
Appellees. 
Case No.20090776 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
Appellate jurisdiction in this matter was invoked by the Plaintiffs' and Appellants5 
(hereinafter "CCW" and the "Wilbergs" and collectively the "Plaintiffs") timely filing 
of a Notice of Appeal on September 17, 2009, from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order entered August 18, 2009 (the "Judgment"), by the Honorable Douglas 
B. Thomas in the Seventh Judicial District Court, Emery County, State of Utah. This 
Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UT. CODE ANN. §78A-3-102 (4), which 
allows transfer of certain matters from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1 
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A. UT. CODE ANN. §4-26-5 
B. UT. CODE ANN. §4-26-5.1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter was initiated by CCW and the Wilbergs against the Nielsens by the 
filing of the Complaint dated January 4, 2006 (the "Complaint"), which is attached 
hereto as Addendum "A" and incorporated herein by this reference. The Complaint 
alleged an agreement between the Wilbergs and the Nielsens, which had been entered 
into approximately eighteen (18) months before the filing of the Complaint. The 
Complaint alleged Ross Wilberg telephoned Chris Nielsen, wherein it was agreed the 
Wilbergs would build a new fence on the south boundary of the Nielsens' property (the 
"South Fence") and the Nielsens would build a new fence on the north boundary (the 
"North Fence") of the Nielsen's property (the "Oral Agreement"). Attachment "A" at p. 
3. The Complaint further alleged Ross Wilberg relied upon the Oral Agreement by 
constructing nearly three thousand (3,000) lineal feet of new fence dividing the south 
boundary of the Nielsen property from the Wilberg property. Id. The Complaint alleged 
the Nielsens refused, failed and neglected to construct any fence as agreed upon by the 
Oral Agreement. Id. 
The Complaint alleged the Nielsens had seen the construction of the Nielsen's 
fence in reliance upon the Oral Agreement. Id. The Complaint alleged the historic fence 
had not been maintained by the Nielsens in accordance with UT. CODE ANN. §4-26-5, by 
2 
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allowing vegetation and trees to grow out of control, without repairing the fence when 
trees damaged them. Id. 
The Complaint alleged the Nielsen's property met the definition of a Green Belt 
and were adjoining land owners pursuant to UT. CODE ANN. §4-26-5.1, thereby alleging 
the Wilbergs were entitled to create a fence pursuant to said statute. Id. at p. 4. The 
Complaint alleged that, due to the Nielsens' failure to construct their portion of the fence 
pursuant to the Oral Agreement, Wilberg cattle were entering the Nielsen property 
through the Nielsen north boundary. Id. Thus, the Complaint alleged the Nielsens' were 
entitled to cost of the Nielsen's portion of the fence pursuant to UT. CODE ANN. §4-26-
5.1. The Complaint alleged the cost of constructing such a fence would be at minimum 
$39, 600 dollars. Id at p. 5. 
On or about January 31, 2006, the Nielsens filed the Answer and Counterclaim, 
which denied the existence of the Oral Agreement, alleged the cattle were entering the 
Nielsen property through the north boundary, and raised thirteen (13) affirmative 
defenses. The Counterclaim alleged the Wilberg's had allowed their cattle to trespass onto 
the Nielsen's property, thereby damaging and destroying a portion of the fence bordering 
the northern boundary line of the Nielsen's property. The Counterclaim alleged the 
Wilbergs had failed to maintain or repair the parties' northern boundary and, for the prior 
four (4) years had not been raising cattle on their property, which thereby indicated they 
had not contributed to the deterioration of the fence. Accordingly, the Nielsens requested 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
an award of damages pursuant to UT. CODE ANN. §4-25-8, for loss of feed and for 
damage to the fence. 
The trial court entered its Judgment on or about August 19, 2009, which 
conformed with its oral findings on the record as further set forth post. The Plaintiffs 
timely appealed the Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
I. June 19, 2008 Bench Trial. 
A. Testimony of Ross Wilberg. 
Ross testified that both parties had done their own repair of the fence previously 
and it had been his idea for one party to take one side of the fence for repair. Tr. at p. 18. 
Ross estimate the fence was about seventy years old. Id. Ross testified the fence in 2004 
was "basically junk" due to burnt and rotten posts and was falling apart. Tr. at p. 22. Ross 
testified that if cattle trespassed over the fence in need of repair, the cattle would get into 
the alfalfa field and bloat. Tr. at pp. 24-26. Ross testified Chris Nielsen had called him 
and said the Wilbergs' cattle had trespassed onto his land but cattle had trespassed both 
ways. Tr. at p. 26. Ross testified he stated to Chris "we need to build fences." Tr. at p. 26. 
Ross testified he told Chris to take the North Fence and the Nielsens would take the 
South Fence. Tr. at p. 27. Ross testified he began working on the South Fence in the fall 
of 2004 and the Nielsens would have been able to observe this. Tr. at pp. 27-28. 
Ross testified he had taken a picture of a tree from the Nielsens' property that had 
4 
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fallen and damaged the fence, which had been taken on November 29, 2005. Tr. at pp. 
28-29. Ross testified the fence was "junk." Tr. at pp. 28-30. Ross testified the fence was 
rotten and burnt due to the Chris Nielsen burning in the ditches. Tr. at pp. 30-32. Ross 
testified the fence in 2005 was consistent with what it was like in 2004. Tr. at p. 32. Ross 
testified he had built the South Fence from the alfalfa field on the Nielsen property to the 
ponds where the fence took a right hand turn. Tr. at p. 35. Ross testified he finished the 
fence by the spring of 2006. Id. Ross testified he constructed the fence pursuant to state 
code based upon his experience as a contractor, which was adequate to hold cattle. Tr. at 
pp. 37-38. Ross testified the Nielsens began to commence repair of the north fence in the 
spring of 2006. Tr. at p. 47. 
Ross testified the Nielsens' irrigation ditch was about three (3) feet from the fence 
and closer in some areas, which would cause water to penetrate the area around the ditch. 
Tr. at p. 62. Ross testified it was his opinion based upon his experience on fencing, the 
North Fence the Nielsens had repaired would not last very long. Tr. at p. 79. Ross 
testified he meant that, when he told Chris Nielsen to take the North Fence and Ross 
would take the South Fence, they would build a new fence. Tr. at p. 130. Ross testified 
that, at the deposition in this matter, he had indicated to Chris that they should build 
something that would hold up. Tr. at p. 132. 
Ross testified there is no way to determine the age of a cedar post. Tr. at p. 133. 
Ross testified it is also hard to determine the age of wire used in the construction of a 
5 
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fence. Tr. at pp. 133-134. Ross testified cedar posts are the same as steel posts. Tr. at pp. 
137-138. Ross testified an irrigation ditch approximately three (3) feet from a fence 
would not cause damage. Tr. at p. 143. 
Ross testified how he had repaired and patched the South Fence using used 
materials and before rebuilding the remainder of the fence, the Nielsens began 
construction on the North Fence. Tr. at pp. 146-147. Ross testified he first rebuilt the 
fence over the section of the alfalfa on the Nielsens' property using used materials. Tr. at 
p. 152. Ross testified he next did some patchwork along the remainder of the southern 
fence line. Id. Ross testified the Nielsens began reconstruction on the North Fence of the 
fence using used materials. Tr. at pp. 152-153. Ross testified that on the remainder of the 
fence on the southern side he used new and used materials. Tr. at p. 153. 
Ross testified that since the fence had been rebuilt none of his cows had gotten 
into the alfalfa. Tr. at p. 154. Ross testified this was evidence of an adequate fence. Id. 
Ross testified he did not tear the old fence out when reconstructing it and the new fence 
was approximately three (3) feet from the old. Id. Ross testified this was dangerous for 
livestock. Tr. at p. 155. Ross testified the old fence was on the Nielsens' side of the 
property and it would be their livestock and horses that would get into it. Tr. at p. 156. 
Ross testified that if cattle are getting out of the property it is a good indication the fence 
needs maintenance, which was custom in this area between neighbors. Tr. at pp. 157, 159. 
Ross later testified it was his personal experience neighbors sat down and decided 
6 
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which regulation type fence should be put in a fence in need of replacement. Tr. at p. 425. 
Ross testified he had approximately thirty-two (32) miles of boundary fence, which was 
in the top three (3) in terms of size in the county. Tr. at pp. 430-431. Ross testified the 
only time he had not used government regulation for a fence was when he was just 
repairing a fence. Tr. at p. 431. 
Ross testified it was not his agreement with Chris Nielsen that they were just 
going to do a quick repair job of the fence at issue. Id. It was Ross's opinion that the 
Nielsens' fence would last approximately a year or two. Tr. at p. 434. Ross testified the 
conversation surrounding the Oral Agreement was heated. Tr. at p. 451. Ross testified that 
the Oral Agreement did not include standards for the fence. Tr. at p. 452. Ross testified he 
completed two thousand (2,000) feet of his portion of the South Fence in 2005 and the 
Nielsens had finished their portion of the North Fence in 2007, meaning the Nielsens had 
completed the North Fence before the Wilbergs finished the South Fence. Tr. at pp. 456-
457. Ross testified Chris Nielsen had stated, "Fine, I'll do it," in response to Ross's 
proposal that he would take the South Fence and Chris take the North Fence. Tr. at pp. 
462-463. Ross testified the Nielsens began construction on the North Fence two (2) years 
after the lawsuit was filed and it took them three (3) weeks to complete it. Tr. at p. 463. 
B. Testimony of Shane Campbell. 
Campbell owns a construction company that does work for the BLM and the 
Forest Service. Tr. at p. 82. Campbell has run cattle all his life. Tr. at p. 83. Campbell saw 
7 
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the Wilbergs' South Fence and found it was in general compliance with regulation, which 
was also typical offences in the local area. Tr. at pp. 84-85. Campbell testified the cost of 
fencing has gone up, with the cost of materials and labor having a 50/50 relationship. Tr. 
at p. 86. Campbell testified a 6,600 foot fence would cost $2 a foot in materials, which 
would be $4 a foot for materials and labor and approximately $26,400 for the entire 
fence. Tr. at pp. 87-88. Campbell testified the Wilbergs' fence would contain livestock but 
had doubts about the North Fence. Tr. at p. 89. Campbell testified he would not want his 
cows "in there with that fence between me and alfalfa field." Tr. at p. 90. On cross-
examination, Campbell testified he has been friends with Ross Wilberg for a lot of years 
and they socialized together. Tr. at p. 92. Campbell testified he had seen cows go through 
regulation fences. Tr. at p. 97. Campbell also testified he had seen cows stay on their side 
of a fence that did not appear to be adequate. Tr. at p. 98. 
C. Testimony of Chris Nielsen. 
Chris testified that over the prior forty (40) years he had continuously reset posts, 
drove steel posts, and wired stays into them. Tr, at pp. 184-185. Chris did so to maintain 
the fence to keep his cows home. Tr. at p. 185. Chris testified he would fix the fence 
when his cows got out and when the Wilbergs' cows came on his property. Tr. at pp. 185-
186. Chris testified he quit running cattle five (5) years ago and leased for two (2) years 
to his brother-in-law. Tr. at pp. 186-187. Chris testified he did not own the cows since he 
was selling the feed to his brother-in-law. Tr. at p. 188. Chris testified that once the grass 
8 
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on the Wilbergs' side of the fence was gone, the cows would come right back. Tr. at p. 
189. Chris testified he began to maintain the fence less and less at this time because he 
thought it was Ross's duty to keep his cows home and Chris had less duty to do so since 
he no longer owned the cows on his property. Id. Chris testified that, when the Wilbergs' 
cattle would trespass, he would call Ross, ask him to remove his cattle, and to fix the 
fence. Id. Chris testified Ross did do that a time or two. Tr. at pp. 189-190. Chris testified 
that it got to the point that, when he called Ross to tell him about cattle trespassing onto 
Nielsen property, Ross would threaten to sue. Tr. at p. 190. Chris testified Ross would 
remove cattle from Nielsen property twice daily at one point because there was no feed 
on the Wilbergs' side of the fence. Id. Chris testified Ross would not take the time to 
maintain the fence and, since Chris figured it was Ross's cows breaking the fence down, 
Chris figured Ross should maintain it. Id. 
Chris testified he called Ross and, during the conversation, Ross stated he would 
get a fencing agreement and Chris would sign it. Tr. at p. 195. Chris testified he told Ross 
he would only sign it if both parties benefited equally. Id. Chris testified he stated, 
"whatever," and hung up in response to Ross telling him he would build the South Fence 
and Chris would build the North Fence. Id. Chris testified Ross started building a new 
South Fence, using old wire and a few new posts plus Chris's twenty-five (25) posts he 
had recently put in. Id. Chris testified he did not start building the North Fence because 
he did not like how Ross was building the South Fence and was waiting to see if Ross 
9 
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was going to build the whole South Fence like that. Tr. at p. 196. Chris testified he built 
his fence using a seven (7) strand barbed fence with a post every twelve (12) feet with 
one (1) to three (3) dancers. Tr. at p. 197. Chris testified the fence he built was just like 
others in the county and it was common to the area. Id. Christ said he understood from 
the phone conversation, defined herein as the Oral Agreement, that Ross was going to 
start building a good fence along the southern boundary. Tr. at pp. 197-198. Chris 
testified no standard of the fence was mentioned. Tr. at p. 198. Chris testified he felt the 
fence he rebuilt on the northern boundary was adequate. Id. Chris testified Ross had 
simply indicated he would build the South Fence and Chris would build the North Fence. 
Id 
Chris testified about the work he performed reconstructing the North Fence. Tr. at 
pp. 200-216. Chris testified waste water from the Wilberg property would run off into his 
irrigation ditch. Tr. at p. 219. At this point, the trial court indicated the evidence so far 
showed a cow could get through anything even if a fence was adequate, which had been 
established by the Wilbergs. Tr. at p. 227. Chris testified he rebuilt the North Fence in 
February or March of 2007. Tr. at p. 229. Chris testified that, since then, cows broke 
through the fence once. Tr. at p. 230. Chris testified he had not made any repairs of the 
fence from the time of the Oral Agreement and December of 2005. Tr. at p. 243. Chris 
testified that, between the time of the Oral Agreement and February or March of 2007, he 
had not repaired the North Fence. Tr. at p. 247. Chris testified he did not purchase 
10 
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materials for the improvement of the North Fence. Tr. at p. 258. Chris testified he 
received a check from the Wilbergs for their cattle grazing on his property and later 
cashed it. Tr. at p. 264. 
D. Testimony of Cash Winn, Expert Witness. 
Winn is a state licensed fence contractor and a rancher/cattleman. Tr. at p. 271. 
When he inspected the fence at issue, Winn requested not to be told whose fence was 
whose in his inspection. Tr. at p. 272. Winn testified he knew both parties and was there 
to give an honest opinion about the fence lines. Id. Winn inspected the fences at issue 
four (4) to six (6) weeks ago. Tr. at p. 273. Winn testified he first went down the north 
side and then the south. Id. Winn testified the north side had a lot of cedar posts and a lot 
of wooden dancers, with seven (7) strands in place and tightly tied. Id. Winn testified the 
North Fence had a lot of riders in it and a lot of posts and looked like "a darned good 
fence." Id. Winn testified it was an adequate fence and some of the materials that were 
used looked old. Id. Winn testified it was actually better maintained than most fences in 
the county for cattlemen and sheep men in the area. Tr. at p. 274. Winn testified it was 
better than 90% of fences he had on his property. Id. 
Winn testified wood riders, mostly willow sticks, takes more time, more labor, and 
costs more money because they have to hook every wire to the rider and were better than 
metal ones. Tr. at pp. 274-275. Winn testified he had one-hundred (100) year old fences 
on his property and they required more maintenance and had replaced a lot of them. Tr. at 
11 
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p. 281. 
Winn testified the Nielsens' ditch was far enough away from the fence line that 
they would not contribute to the deterioration of the fence. Tr. at p. 282. Winn testified 
the South Fence was a "tight fence." Tr. at p. 283. Winn testified the South Fence had 
good braces and the only problem with it was the bracing may have been too far apart. Id. 
Winn testified he felt it was a good fence and it was adequate to hold cattle. Id. Winn 
testified the entire fence line was "very adequate." Id. Winn testified that, once cattle 
learn to push through a fence, it becomes harder to stop them. Tr. at p. 288. Winn testified 
the fence at issue was more than average in the county to contain cattle. Id. Winn testified 
that, in a high alkali type of terrain, it is better to have wooden posts than steel. Tr. at pp. 
312-313. Winn testified the area at issue was high alkali and cedar posts would be better. 
Tr. at pp. 313-314. Winn testified it is less expensive to put in a brand new fence for labor 
costs. Tr. at p. 319. 
July 9, 2008, Continuation of Trial: 
E. Testimony of Sunny Nielsen, 
Sunny kept a record of Wilberg cows that would enter the Nielsens' property. Tr. at 
pp. 335-336. Sunny began keeping the record on October 9, 2005. Tr. at p. 336. From the 
10th of October to November of 2005, Sunny recorded from as few as two (2) to as many 
as eighty (80) head of cattle trespassing. Tr. at pp. 337-340. Counting every day, Sunny 
found there were probably 2,500 cattle that had been in on the Nielsen's property. Tr. at 
12 
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pp. 340-341. Sunny testified 2,500 cattle would likely consume approximately 625 bales 
of hay, which was approximately $1,520. Tr. at pp. 345-346. Sunny testified no one had 
burned the fence line in question due to the feed there. Tr. at pp. 349-350. Sunny agreed 
that, due to the fence's age, it was reasonable to expect it was time to start rebuilding the 
fence. Tr. at p. 351. Sunny testified it was her understanding that cattle owners were 
responsible for their cattle and cattle owners should keep them on their property. Tr. at p. 
354. 
The trial court allowed video of the fence line strictly for the purpose of rebuttal, 
since the Wilbergs had rested their case in chief. Tr. at pp. 375-377. Sunny admitted she 
would probably not leave braces in the condition shown by the video. Tr. at pp. 381-382. 
Sunny testified the law of the west was to take care of your cattle. Tr. at p. 401. Sunny 
testified the video showed the grass was right against the fence, which indicated the cows 
could not reach through the fence. Tr. at p. 402. This evidenced to Sunny the fence was 
adequate. Tr. at p. 403. The trial court indicated there are government standards not 
necessarily tied to the types of fence that are used commonly in this area, which was 
important to the trial court since there were not any governmental agencies involved the 
case. Tr. at p. 409. The trial court indicated it had not heard testimony that adjacent land 
owners relied on governmental regulation for fences in private matters. Tr. at p. 411. 
F. Closing Arguments and Oral Findings 
The trial court asked opposing counsel during closing arguments whether the legal 
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descriptions submitted at trial describe the amount of land enclosed for each party's 
parcel of land. Tr. at p. 480. The trial court indicated the statute at issue says "enclosed/' 
or else the trial court would not have the ability to apportion. Tr. at p. 481. Opposing 
counsel argued the statute intended the length of the fence for the basis of determining 
apportion. Tr. at pp. 481-482. However, opposing counsel was unable to show the trial 
court the language of the statute that would allow such a reading. Tr. at pp. 481-482. The 
trial court plainly outlined its approach to this matter in determining apportionment, by 
stating the following: 
Isn't it possible for me simply to take a look at the amount enclosed in the 
Wilberg property on the north, compare that to the amount enclosed in the 
Nielsen property and determine then that that is the apportionment for the 
north fence? Do the same thing and say what is the amount of property 
owned by the Wilbergs on the south, determine that that then needs to be 
compared with the amount of the Nielsen property and that would be the 
apportionment on the south, for the south fence? And those are your two 
numbers. 
Tr. at p. 483. The trial court asked opposing counsel whether it had the figures for the 
fence boundary between the parties, to which opposing counsel answered, "[y]ou do not 
have those figures." Tr. at p. 484. The trial court indicated the difficulty with this case 
was that the issue was not about the total of acreage enclosed, it was about the fences at 
issue not meeting. Tr. at p. 491. The trial court indicated it had two (2) separate fences to 
look at and would take the total amount of what the Nielsens own since that would be the 
amount being protected by the North Fence. Id. The trial court stated, "[t]hey're two 
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separate fences and the statute can only be applied by following that formula for both 
fences. That's the only way it makes any sense." Tr. at p. 492. The trial court stated its 
understanding and reading of the statute meant that if a fence is protecting one landowner 
substantially more because there is a larger herd putting pressure on the fence, then it is 
fair for the larger landowner to pay a larger proportion of the fence cost. Tr. at pp. 495-
496. 
The Nielsens argued it was unfair for a large property owner to come in, tear out 
an old fence, put in a new fence, and require a small property owner to be responsible for 
half the cost. Tr. at pp. 501-502. The Nielsens argued UT. CODE ANN. §4-26-5 applied 
should the trial court find an agreement between the parties and alternatively argued if an 
agreement was not found, UT. CODE ANN. §4-26-5.1 applied. The Nielsens asserted the 
existence of the Oral Agreement and that the agreement was that the fence would be 
adequate. Tr. at pp. 510-511. The phrase "based upon the amount of land enclosed" does 
not indicate the distance of the linear boundary but plainly indicates the amount of land 
enclosed in the Wilberg property to the north compared to the amount enclosed in the 
Nielsen property and the amount of land enclosed by the Wilberg property to the south 
compared to the amount enclosed in Nielsen property. Such a formula is consistent with 
the plain reading of "the amount of land enclosed" by the fence. The Plaintiffs' reading of 
the statute is not supported by the plain reading and meaning UT. CODE ANN. § 4-26-5.1, 
which does not include any language regarding the linear distance of a fence. 
15 
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The trial court made oral findings on the record and found the common practice 
between the parties when cattle were out, was to retrieve the cattle and then find and 
repair the fence where the cattle escaped. Tr. at p. 519. The trial court found the Wilbergs' 
cattle were frequently on the Nielsens' property as established by the Nielsens. Id. The 
trial court found the parties entered into the Oral Agreement, during which Ross told 
Chris he would be responsible for paying for and taking the cost of rebuilding the South 
Fence if Chris agreed to do the same for the North Fence. Tr. at p. 520. The trial court 
found the parties' subsequent conduct indicated they had agreed to this arrangement. Id. 
The trial court found in the two (2) or three (3) years following the Oral Agreement, the 
Nielsens repaired or rebuilt the South Fence and the Wilbergs repaired or rebuilt the 
North Fence, with each party bearing the cost of their obligation. Id. 
The trial court found it noteworthy that, while the parties entered into the Oral 
Agreement, the parties did not discuss or adopt any particular standard for the repair or 
rebuilding of the fences. Tr. at p. 521. The trial court believed there was an assumption 
the fence would require it to be adequate and the trial court credited Chris Nielsens' 
testimony that the Oral Agreement was to build a good fence common to other fences 
around the county. Id. The trial court found the cattle had escaped only once since the 
Nielsens' had repaired the North Fence and this was a result of a gate malfunction, not 
because of any inadequacy of the fence. Tr. at p. 523. The trial court found both parties 
were responsible for the moist soil around the fence. Tr. at p. 524. 
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The trial court found Campbell's credibility was diminished due to his close 
association with the Wilbergs. Id. The trial court relied upon Winn's opinion that the 
North Fence was adequate to keep cattle in and is better than most fences in Emery 
County. Tr. at p. 526. The trial court relied upon Winn's testimony in that Winn testified 
both fences were adequate but neither met the standards by UDOT. Tr. at p. 527. The trial 
court found that the most compelling fact in this matter was that, since the fence had been 
built, the cattle had not entered the Nielsens' property. Tr. at pp. 527-528. 
Thus, the trial court determined the parties had contracted around UT. CODE ANN. 
§4-26-5.1, which was the testimony of both parties. Tr. at p. 528. The trial court 
determined the following: 
In this case we've had a civil action that's been brought but there's been no 
damages that have been claimed. Plaintiffs haven't brought a claim that that 
fence has not been maintained and has caused some damages. They haven't 
asserted, for example, this would be an example, that cattle have gotten into 
the alfalfa and have actually bloated. They talked about that risk and I 
acknowledge that risk but I don't think there's been any damages that have 
been shown as a result of any problem with the north fence. 
Tr. at p. 529. 
On the issue for future maintenance, for the north, the trial court found 2.98.96 
was owned by the Wilbergs and the Nielsens owned 152.90 and therefore assigned the 
Nielsens' share to be .3384 with the Wilbergs responsible for the rest. Id. For the south 
side, the trial court found the Wilbergs' parcel was 240.32 and the Nielsens' parcel was 
152.9 and therefore assigned the Nielsens' share of responsibility to be 38.88%. Tr. at p. 
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530. The trial court was uncertain of when in the future repairs would be needed, but was 
certain, based upon Winn's testimony, the fence was adequate to keep cattle contained. 
Id. The trial court found the parties had stipulated UT. CODE ANN. §4-26-5.1 applied to 
this issue and controlled. Id. 
The trial court determined the Nielsens' counterclaim had been unsupported, as the 
testimony had been speculative as to the amount of hay consumed by the Wilbergs' cattle. 
Tr. at p. 531. Further, the trial court found the check sent by the Wilbergs to the Nielsens 
had been cashed by the Nielsens with respect to the counterclaim, and found in favor of 
the Wilbergs. Tr. at pp. 531-532. The trial court stated, "I think the statutes are difficult as 
we are sorting those out, as Ms. White has indicated. They are somewhat difficult to 
interpret but I tried to interpret them the best that I can particularly in light of what I 
found to be an oral agreement in this case." Tr. at p. 532. 
II. January 29, 2009, Hearing on Plaintiff's Objection to Defense 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
On January 29, 2009, the matter came for hearing on CCW and the Wilbergs' 
Objection to the Nielsens' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (the 
"Hearing"). Counsel herein stipulated to the northern boundary being 298.96 acres. Hrg. 
Tr. at p. 2. The trial court made clear the purpose of the Hearing was to make sure the 
final order corresponded completely with the final order at the hearing following the 
evidentiary hearing. Hrg. Tr. at p. 3. The trial court indicated both fences were adequate 
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and common in Emery County. Id. The trial court indicated the Nielsens were responsible 
for 33.84% of the maintenance of the North Fence and the Wilbergs were responsible for 
the remaining balance. Id. For the South Fence, the trial court indicated the Nielsens were 
responsible for 38.88% of the maintenance of the South Fence and the Wilbergs were 
responsible for the remaining balance. Id. 
The Wilbergs argued the statute required a determination of each party's parcel by 
their boundary and determine what benefit the fence becomes in their boundaries. Hrg. 
Tr. at p. 8. Counsel herein objected to this argument, since this argument had not been 
presented o the trial court before and would therefore allow the Wilbergs a second bite at 
the apple. Id. The trial court agreed, indicating it had already ruled, stating, "I came up 
with the percentages based upon the evidence that was offered that day, did I? Unless 
there was something that I did at trial that - in other words, I'm not going to go back 
through and reopen that whole issue." Id. Counsel for the Wilbergs responded, "[n]o, 
Your Honor." The trial court continued, "I think I ruled upon what was presented. If 
there's something in that order that was unclear, then I'm happy to look at that. But the 
minute entry evidently didn't think it was unclear because I allocated percentages, didn't 
IT Id. 
The trial court again told counsel for the Wilbergs their argument at this hearing 
should have been made at trial. Hrg. Tr. at p. 9. Counsel for the Wilbergs indicated this 
argument was not made at trial, stating, "we actually argued how the statute should be 
19 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
applied since there was nothing to direct us on how it should be applied." Id. The trial 
court again indicated the purpose of the hearing was to ensure the final order conformed 
with the order at the day of the hearing because the Wilbergs had objected to the form of 
the proposed order. Id. The Wilbergs further argued the plats had been entered into 
evidence at trial in order for the trial court to calculate the boundary lines. Hrg. Tr. at p. 
10. The Wilbergs argued the trial court had used an inappropriate formula and the trial 
court could not stand behind its calculations. Hrg. Tr. at pp. 10-11. 
The trial court indicated the Wilbergs had not argued about the size of the parties' 
parcel in terms of the evidence presented, which had been submitted as evidence but not 
stipulated as conclusions. Hrg. Tr. at p. 12. The Wilbergs indicated they believed the trial 
court had based its calculations on the size of acreage rather than what the boundaries 
added up to, which the trial court indicated was appropriately brought by post-judgment 
motion, such as a Rule 60(b) motion, since the purpose of the hearing at that time was to 
determine whether the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law conformed with 
the trial court's earlier order. Hrg. Tr. at p. 14. 
The Nielsens requested a clarification on what the actual number of the acreages 
had been determined by the trial court since they were absent from counsel's notes. Hrg. 
Tr. at pp. 17-18. The trial court indicated it used evidence that was presented at trial in 
terms of the parcels that were presented and acreage that was indicated, did a quick 
mathematical calculation of those amounts and it came out to these percentages in terms 
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of sharing. Hrg. Tr. at p. 19. 
The Wilbergs argued the acreage instead of calculating the boundary had a 
dramatic effect on the order. Hrg. Tr. at p. 20. The Wilbergs further argued the allocation 
of future costs as determined by the trial court flew in the face of statute at issue. Hrg. Tr. 
at p. 21. The trial court indicated its ruling was based upon UT. CODE ANN. §4-26-5.1 (4), 
which indicated the cost of maintenance of a fence shall also be apportioned between 
each party based upon the amount of land enclosed. Id. The trial court indicated this 
language has to do with acreage. Id. The trial court found there was already a fence and 
was focusing on the maintenance of the fence. Hrg. Tr. at p. 22. The trial court found the 
statute presumed that once there's a fence in place, the parties were going to maintain it 
and keep it to appropriate standards. Hrg. Tr. at p. 23. The trial court stated, "..as things 
need to be repaired, then you'll divide that in accordance with the amount of land 
enclosed." Hrg. Tr. at p. 24. 
The trial court stated the issue of the cost of a new fence in the future was not 
before it at trial, which would have been speculative from its perspective. Id. The trial 
court asserted the existing fence was adequate. Id. The trial court declined to incorporate 
into its findings regarding a new fence that may or may not be built in the future. Hrg. Tr. 
at p. 26. The trial court stated, "[t]hat issue simply wasn't before me. It wasn't argued, it 
wasn't briefed, it wasn't presented, and the facts didn't warrant it." Hrg. Tr. at p. 27. The 
trial court indicated it relied on the language in the statute. Id. The trial court indicated 
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what changes needed to be made in the final order, which were mainly typographical, and 
again stated it would be unfair to reargue the issues of the case. Hrg. Tr. at pp. 35-36. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The preservation rule "is based on the premise that, 'in the interest of orderly 
procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to address a claim error and, if 
appropriate, correct it."' State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, | 33, 122 P.3d 543 citing State v. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11, 10 R3d 346. Thus, "[a]s a general rule, claims not raised 
before the trial court may not be raised on appeal." Id. citing Holgate. The Plaintiffs raise 
issues on appeal that were not first preserved with the trial court. The Plaintiffs have not 
demonstrated how they preserved issues. The Plaintiffs have not abided by orderly 
procedure, which is to give to the trial court the opportunity to address the claim of error. 
Cruz at \ 33.The Plaintiffs have also raised issues but have failed to include argument, 
analysis, and/or legal authority in support of these issues. The Plaintiffs raised issue with 
the constitutionality of Section 4-26-5.1 and how this section discriminates against large 
property owners; however, the arguments for these issues are absent in the remainder of 
the Opening Brief. In short, the Plaintiffs have dumped the burden of argument and 
research upon this Court, which is non-compliant with UT. R. APR P. 24. Thus, this Court 
should not address these inadequately briefed issues. 
0 
Any reliance upon an oral contract is necessarily determined by the evidence. See, 
Martin v. Scholl 678 P.2d 274 (Utah,1983). The trial court in this matter considered the 
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evidence submitted to it and determined the existence of the Oral Agreement. The 
Nielsens also testified to and agreed to its existence. Thus, viewed as a whole, the 
evidence shows the existence of the Oral Agreement and the Plaintiffs have failed to 
overcome the trial court's findings in support thereof. 
This Court has held, "[w]hen we construe a statute, we first explore its plain 
language and use other modes of interpretation only if the language contains 
ambiguities." DeLand v. Uintah County, 945 P.2d 172, 174 (Utah App., 1997) citing Gull 
Lab.. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 936 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah Ct.App.1997). The 
statute at issue states, "[t]he cost of the maintenance of the fence shall also be 
apportioned between each party based upon the amount of land enclosed." UT. CODE 
ANN. § 4-26-5.1 (4). In the instant case, the Opening Brief is crowded with addenda for 
this Court's review in determining the Legislature's intent behind UT. CODE ANN. §4-26-
5.1. However, the Legislature's intent is unnecessary as the statute's plain language is 
unambiguous. 
The plain meaning of the phrase "based upon the amount of land enclosed" does 
not mean the distance of the linear boundary but plainly means the amount of land 
enclosed in the Wilberg property to the north compared to the amount enclosed in the 
Nielsen property and the amount of land enclosed by the Wilberg property to the south 
compared to the amount enclosed in Nielsen property. Such a formula is consistent with 
the plain reading of "the amount of land enclosed" by the fence. The Plaintiffs' reading of 
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the statute is not supported by the plain reading and meaning UT. CODE ANN. § 4-26-5.1, 
which does not include any language regarding the linear distance of a fence. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held, "[w]hen reviewing a district court's findings of 
fact on appeal, we do not undertake an independent assessment of the evidence presented 
during the course of trial and reach our own separate findings with respect to that 
evidence." 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat Inc., 2004 UT 72, ^ 75, 99 P.3d 801. In the 
instant case, the Plaintiffs argue the Judgment is against the clear weight of evidence at 
trial. While the Plaintiffs have set forth evidence in support of their arguments on appeal, 
equally credible evidence exists to support the trial court's ultimate determinations in this 
matter. See, 438 Main Street at Tf 75. Furthermore, any burden by the Plaintiffs to 
overcome this appellate hurdle has not been met. This Court has been presented with 
evidence that only support the Plaintiffs' version of events. 
This Court has recently held, "a party cannot take advantage of an error committed 
at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error." Braun v. Nevada 
Chemicals, Inc., 2010 UT App. 188, If 15, 236 P.3d 176 citing Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 
41, f 17, 164 P.3d 366. In the instant case, the Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred by 
determining the future maintenance contributions from each party. However, the 
Plaintiffs' position on this issue below invited error due to their lack of evidence 
submitted trial and failure to argue it before the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
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I. THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PRESERVE ISSUES RAISED ON 
APPEAL. 
UTAH R.APR P. 24(a)(5) requires a statement of the issues presented for review 
with the standard of review, as well as citation to the record showing the issue was 
preserved in the trial court or a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not 
preserved in the trial court. The preservation rule "is based on the premise that, 'in the 
interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to address a 
claim error and, if appropriate, correct it.'" State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, ^ 33, 122 P.3d 543 
citing State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346. Thus, "[a]s a general rule, claims 
not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal." Id. citing Holgate. 
"This preservation rule has been extended to apply to every claim unless a [party] 
can demonstrate that exceptional circumstances exist or plain error occurred." State ex 
rel. D.B.. 2010 UT App. I l l , [^6, 231 P.3d 819 citing Lunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App. 192, 
^23, 186 P.3d 978. Thus, "[ijssues that are not raised at trial are generally deemed to be 
waived." Id. citing 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat Inc., 2004 UT 72, 1J51, 99 R3d 978. 
Accordingly, "[t]he presence of a constitutional issue does not excuse an appellant from 
complying with the preservation rules set by the supreme court and the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure." Id. citing O'Deav. Plea, 2009 UT 46,118, 217 P.3d 704. 
"For a trial court to be afforded an opportunity to correct the error 4(1) the issue 
must be raised in a timely fashion[,] (2) the issue must be specifically raisedf,] and (3) the 
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challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.'" 438 
Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, f519 99 P.3d 801 citing Brookside Mobile 
Home Park, Ltd. V. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, [^14, 48 P.3d 968 quoting Badger v. Brooklyn 
Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah, 1998). 
In the instant case, the Plaintiffs for the first time argue the issue of the future 
determination of the cost of rebuilding the North Fence was a moot issue because the trial 
court did not have the real parties in interest before it. Opening Brief at p. 33. This seems 
to be a tangent to the real argument for the Plaintiffs, as the Plaintiffs then argue the 
future maintenance contributions issue was hotly contested as evidenced by the Wilbergs' 
objections to the Nielsens' first set of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Opening 
Brief at p. 34; see, R0139. The Plaintiffs argue their proposed formula was attached to 
their objection. Opening Brief at p. 34. The Plaintiffs therefore request the future costs 
associated with the North Fence be declared moot due to the change in ownership or, 
alternatively, this Court correct the apportionment f#mula so as to be in compliance with 
Section 4-26-5.1(3) for new fence construction and Section 4-26-5.1(4) for fence repairs 
and general maintenance. Opening Brief at p. 36. 
The Plaintiffs also argue the trial court failed to address the Wilbergs' alternative 
claim for damages for breach of the fencing agreement under Section 4-26-5, as the trial 
court found the North Fence was adequate to restrain cattle. The Plaintiffs again pick and 
choose the evidence to support their position. The Plaintiffs ignore the trial court's 
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determination this issue had not been properly evidenced at trial, which is the Plaintiffs' 
failure and not the trial court's. 
Moreover, these issues were never properly brought before the trial court, which is 
particularly evidenced by the trial and Hearing in this matter. At trial, the trial court asked 
opposing counsel whether it had the figures for the fence boundary between the parties, 
to which opposing counsel answered, "[y]ou do not have those figures." Tr. at p. 484. At 
the Hearing, the Wilbergs argued Section 4-26-5.1 required a determination of each 
party's parcel by their boundary and determine what benefit the fence becomes in their 
boundaries. Hrg. Tr. at p. 8. Counsel herein objected to this argument, since this argument 
had not been presented to the trial court before and would therefore allow the Wilbergs a 
second bite at the apple. Id. The trial court agreed, indicating it had already ruled, stating, 
"I came up with the percentages based upon the evidence that was offered that day, didn't 
I? Unless there was something that I did at trial that - in other words, I'm not going to go 
back through and reopen that whole issue." Id. Counsel for the Wilbergs responded, 
"[n]o, Your Honor." Id. The trial court continued, "I think I ruled upon what was 
presented. If there's something in that order that was unclear, then I'm happy to look at 
that. But the minute entry evidently didn't think it was unclear because I allocated 
percentages, didn't I?" Id. Throughout the Hearing, the trial court consistently informed 
opposing counsel that the argument should have been made at trial and the purpose of the 
Hearing was to ensure the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law conformed to 
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the oral findings. Hrg. Tr. at p. 8, 9, 12, 14, 24, and 27. Furthermore, the trial court 
indicated to opposing counsel a post-judgment motion was the appropriate route to take 
to determine whether to reopen the issue. Hrg. Tr. at p. 14. 
Therefore, pursuant to UTAH R.APP. P. 24(a)(5), the Plaintiffs have failed to 
preserve the issue of future determinations of the rebuilding or maintenance of the North 
Fence. The Plaintiffs have not demonstrated how they preserved this issue and the trial 
court itself indicated this was not argued, briefed, or evidenced at trial and was 
appropriately brought by post-judgment motion. The Plaintiffs have not abided by orderly 
procedure, which is to give to the trial court to address the claim of error. Cruz at f^ 33. 
The Plaintiffs have not demonstrated how this lack of preservation escapes the 
preservation rule, particularly since they have not argued exceptional circumstances exist 
or plain error occurred. D.B. at ^6. This Court should note the Plaintiffs had the 
opportunity to raise the issue at trial and could have argued this approach at trial but did 
not do so. Hence, the issue must be deemed waived by this Court. Id. The Utah Supreme 
Court and the Rules of Appellate Procedure have articulated the procedure for 
preservation of issues, which the Plaintiffs have not complied with. Accordingly, their 
claim for review on these issues should be declined by this Court. 
II. THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY BRIEF ISSUES 
RAISED ON APPEAL. 
This Court has held, "[w]e will review an issue only if the appealing party's brief 
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provides '(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; 
or (B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial 
court.'" State v. Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App. 191, ^ 9, 186 P.3d 1023 citing UTAH 
R.APP. P. 24(a)(5). Further, Rule 24(a)(9) requires argument of the issues raised. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held the following: 
We have long held that we have discretion to not address an inadequately 
briefed argument. See, e.g., Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 770 
(Utah 1987). Rather, a party "must plead his claims with sufficient 
specificity for this court to make a ruling on the merits." Allen v. Friel, 
2008 UT 56,1| 9, 194 P.3d 903. "[W]e will not assume [a party's] 'burden of 
argument and research.' " Id. (quoting Treffv. Hinckley, 2001 UT 50, If 11, 
26 P.3d 212).In addition to sufficient development of the argument and 
citation to legal authority, a party must also "provide the appellate court 
with the parts of the record that are central to the determination o f the 
issue. Id. Tf lO.Relevant parts of the record may include "findings of fact 
and conclusions of law [or] the transcript of the court's oral decision." 
UTAH R.APP. P. 24(a)( 11 )(C). 
Angel Investors. LLC v. Garritv, 2009 UT 40, Tf 35, 216 R3d 944 (footnotes included). 
This Court has further held, "[b]riefs that are not in compliance with Rule 24 [of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure] may be disregarded or stricken sua sponte by the court. 
Briefs must contain reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal authority." State v. Sloan, 
2003 UT App. 170, % 13, 72 P.3d 138 citim Smith v. Smith. 1999 UT App. 370 1J8, 995 
P.2d 14. Further, "[a]n issue is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue 
is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court." Id. 
Additionally, "[i]mplicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority but 
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development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority... [T]his court 
is not a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research." Spencer v. Pleasant View City, 2003 UT App. 379, ]f20, 80 P.3d 546 citing 
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah, 1998). 
In the instant case, the Plaintiffs raised issue with the constitutionality of Section 
4-26-5.1, but did not brief or argue this issue in the remainder of the brief. The Plaintiffs 
also raised issue of how the same statute discriminated against large property owners, but 
this issue was also lacking in the brief. Inasmuch as any issue raised by the Plaintiffs was 
not completely argued with appropriate legal authority and analysis, this Court should 
decline to address them. 
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs raise issue with the statutory interpretation with UT. 
CODE ANN. 4-26-5.1 and includes legal authority for this issue; however, no analysis of 
this authority is located within the Opening Brief. See, Opening Brief at pp. 13-20. The 
Plaintiffs rely a great deal on the legislative intent; however, such intent is moot unless 
the language is ambiguous as argued below, which was not argued by the Plaintiffs in the 
Opening Brief. 
The Plaintiffs were required to provide this Court with a citation to the record 
showing the issue was preserved and a statement of grounds for seeking review of the 
issue if it was not preserved with the trial court. Chavez-Espinoza at \9. The Plaintiffs did 
not plead their claims with sufficient specificity for this Court to make a ruling thereon. 
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Angel Investors at f35. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have raised these issues and prayed for 
relief but have assigned the task of argument and research to this Court. Id. The Plaintiffs 
have raised issues absent any argument, analysis, legal authority, or citation to the record 
that would be central to the determination of these issues. See, id. In short, the Plaintiffs 
have dumped the burden of argument and research upon this Court, which is non-
compliant with UT. R. APR P. 24. Thus, this Court should not address these inadequately 
briefed issues. 
HI. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THE 
EXISTENCE OF A CONTRACT, WHICH THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE 
FAILED TO OVERCOME. 
The Utah Supreme Court has long held, "[l]iberty of contract does not mean the 
right to make any kind of contract with any body but merely the right to make contracts 
with competent persons on a plane of relative parity or freedom of choice, and within the 
limits allowed or not forbidden by law." McGrew v. Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 203, 
85 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1938). The Utah Supreme Court has held, "[i]t is well established 
in the law that unexpressed intentions do not affect the validity of a contract." Jaramillo v. 
Farmers Ins. Group, 669 R2d 1231, 1233 (Utah, 1983) citing Allen v. Bissinger & Co., 62 
Utah 226, 219 P. 539, 541-42 (1923). The Utah Supreme Court has stated the following: 
The apparent mutual assent of the parties, essential to the formation of a 
contract, must be gathered by the language employed by them, and the law 
imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning 
of its words and acts. It judges of his intentions by his outward expressions 
and excludes all questions in regard to his unexpressed intention. If his 
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words or acts judged by reasonable standard manifests an intention to agree 
to the matter in question, that agreement is established and it is immaterial 
what may be the real but unexpressed state of his mind upon the subject. 
Donovan v. McGurrin, 69 Utah 1, 251 P. 1067, 1070 (Utah 1926). 
Partial performance on a contract is found when "(1) the oral contract and its terms 
are clear and definite, (2) the acts done in performing the contract are equally clear and 
definite, and (3) the acts are in substantial reliance on the oral contract." Jenkins v. 
Percival 962 P.2d 796, 801 (Utah, 1998) citinz Martin v. Scholl 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 
1983); Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6 Utah 2d 18, 24, 305 P.2d 480, 484 (1956). 
Any reliance upon an oral contract is necessarily determined by the evidence. See, Martin 
v. Scholl 678 P.2d 274 (Utafcul983). 
In respect to the trial court's determination the parties had an oral contract 
concerning the fences, the Opening Brief first argues no contract existed between the 
parties. See, Opening Brief at pp. 20-25. The Wilbergs argue their Complaint relied upon 
UT. CODE ANN. 4-26-5 or, in the alternative, -5.1(3) as amended in 2004. Id. at p. 22. 
However, the Wilbergs acknowledge the Complaint alleged the parties entered into an 
oral agreement concerning the fences. Id. The Wilbergs argue the parties had a brief 
telephone conversation about the parties' cattle trespassing back and forth over the 
fences. Id. The Wilbergs allege their version of events, that Ross Wilberg agreed to build 
a new fence on the south boundary and Chris Nielsen agreed to build a new fence on the 
north boundary. Id. The Complaint alleged the Nielsens had breached the agreement by 
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failing to do anything at all respecting the building of a fence. Id. 
However, in making these arguments, the Plaintiffs rely upon only the parts of the 
record that are beneficial to their position and ignore the evidence that supports the 
Judgment. The Plaintiffs make much of the fact that the Nielsens denied the existence of 
the Oral Agreement; however, the record clearly shows the Nielsens and the Wilbergs 
asserted the existence of the Oral Agreement at trial. See,; Tr. at pp. 26-27 (Ross Wilberg 
testified he told Chris to take the North Fence and Ross would take the South Fence); Tr. 
at p. 95 (Chris Nielsen testified Ross proposed he would build the South Fence and that 
Chris would build the North Fence, to which Chris responded, "whatever"); Tr. at pp. 
510-511 (In closing arguments, counsel herein asserted the existence of the Oral 
Agreement). 
Furthermore, the trial court based its determination of the existence of the Oral 
Agreement due to the common practice between the parties, which was to retrieve the 
cattle when they got out and repair the fence. Tr. at p. 519. The trial court's determination 
of the Oral Agreement was based upon the testimony of both parties, which was that the 
Wilbergs were responsible for the cost of the South Fence and the Nielsens' responsible 
for the cost of the North Fence. Tr. at p. 520. Further, the parties' subsequent conduct 
supported the existence of the Oral Agreement. Id. Ross Wilberg testified he began to 
immediately repair and rebuild the South Fence; however, the South Fence was not 
completed before the Nielsens' repaired the North Fence. See, Tr. at pp. 27-28; 456-457; 
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463. Thus, the Plaintiffs' contention on appeal that the Nielsens did not immediately 
perform on the provisions of the Oral Agreement rings hallow. 
Furthermore, the fact that both Ross Wilberg and Chris Nielsen are expert 
cattlemen and experienced ranchers implies the reasoning behind the Oral Agreement that 
the North and South Fence needed to be adequate to contain the cattle and common to the 
area, which was thoroughly established at trial by both parties. Furthermore, Ross 
Wilberg admitted the parties did not discuss any standard for the fence but initiated the 
action before completing the South Fence and continued with the action after the 
Nielsens' completed the North Fence. 
The unexpressed intentions of the parties do not affect the validity of the Oral 
Agreement. Jaramillo at 1233. Ross testified the conversation surrounding the Oral 
Agreement was heated and testified Chris Nielsen was difficult to get along with; 
however, the problem of the Wilberg cattle trespassing onto the Nielsens' property had to 
be addressed between these neighbors. Consequently, the mutual assent to rebuild the 
North and South Fence of Ross Wilberg and Chris Nielsen can be gathered from their 
telephone conversation, of which both testified similarly to, and from their subsequent 
conduct. Donovan at 1070. Thus, this Court must impute to the parties an intention 
corresponding to the reasonable meaning of their words and acts. Id. The words and acts 
by the parties in this matter, which was judged by the trial court's reasonable standard, 
manifested an intention to repair and/or rebuild the North and South Fence to contain 
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cattle and to conform with fences common to the area. See, id. 
The Oral Agreement was clear and definite. The fence at issue required repair. 
Ross Wilberg and Chris Nielsens' testimony at trial both evidenced the Wilbergs would 
take the South Fence and the Nielsens would take the North Fence. Standards for the 
fence was not discussed; however, due to the experience of the parties, each party built or 
rebuilt an adequate fence, which was supported by the expert, Cash Winn, whose 
testimony was relied upon by the trial court in making its Judgment. Accordingly, the 
Oral Agreement in this matter was clear and definite in its terms. Jenkins at 801. 
The acts in performing the Oral Agreement were equally clear and definite. 
Shortly after the Oral Agreement, the Wilbergs began to build the South Fence. Both 
parties testified at trial respecting the materials and effort that are required to repair 
and/or construct an adequate fence. Cash Winn testified both the South and North Fence 
were adequate fences, meaning the effort by both parties was clear and definite and the 
acts were performed in substantial reliance upon the Oral Agreement. Jenkins at 801. 
The Plaintiffs argue the Nielsens' repair of the North Fence after the 
commencement of the action renders the Oral Agreement invalid. Opening Brief at p. 24. 
However, the Plaintiffs neglect the testimony of Ross Wilberg that was uncontroverted at 
trial, which was the Nielsens finished the North Fence before the Wilbergs finished the 
South Fence. See, Tr. at p. 456-457. Hence, the Plaintiffs argument on this point falls 
short. 
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The Plaintiffs argue the "alleged agreement" was not clear enough to be valid. 
Opening Brief at p. 25. However, the Plaintiffs again ignore substantial testimony in 
making this leap. The parties in this case have extensive backgrounds as cattlemen and 
ranchers. This knowledge and experience evidences an implied agreement that the North 
and South Fences would contain cattle, particularly due to the events leading up to the 
heated conversation surrounding the Oral Agreement. If the Wilbergs desired to collect 
upon the Vi cost of Section 4-26-5.1 (2), the Wilbergs should have discussed the enhanced 
standards they required. However, they did not do so, and their claim the Oral Agreement 
is unenforceable necessarily fails. 
Furthermore, the Opening Brief misconstrues the Complaint in this matter. The 
Complaint was primarily based upon the Oral Agreement and the remedy sought was 
based upon Section 4-26-5.1. The argument that the Oral Agreement is unenforceable 
was not preserved and was not argued below. This position is wholly contrary to the 
Plaintiffs' position at trial, which was the Plaintiffs relied upon the Oral Agreement and 
began to rebuild the South Fence. 
The Wilbergs did not seek damages, only the cost of constructing the North Fence. 
See, Addendum "A". This was plainly acknowledged by the trial court, to which the 
Plaintiffs have not challenged and conveniently ignored in the Opening Brief, as follows: 
In this case we've had a civil action that's been brought but there's been no 
damages that have been claimed. Plaintiffs haven't brought a claim that that 
fence has not been maintained and has caused some damages. They haven't 
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asserted, for example, this would be an example, that cattle have gotten into 
the alfalfa and have actually bloated. They talked about that risk and I 
acknowledge that risk but I don't think there's been any damages that have 
been shown as a result of any problem with the north fence. 
Tr. at p. 529. 
Additionally, the Plaintiffs argue the Nielsens cannot rely upon the Oral 
Agreement since they did not commence construction on the North Fence until after the 
filing of the action as this evidences a "first breach". Opening Brief at p. 25. Such 
argument is without merit, particularly since the Plaintiffs conveniently omit the fact the 
Nielsens finished the North Fence before the Wilbergs completed the South Fence. See, 
Tr. at pp. 456-457. The Plaintiffs were the party asserting the existence of the Oral 
Agreement below and cannot now shift their position as it suits them, particularly since 
the trial court was unable to first determine this argument. 
The Plaintiffs baldly argue the trial court had all of the information necessary to 
enter an award for the cost of the South Fence, due to Ross Wilberg and Shane 
Campbell's testimony. Opening Brief at p. 29. However, the Plaintiffs ignore the trial 
court's determination of Campbell's diminished credibility, since he was well acquainted 
with the Wilbergs. Further, the trial court plainly indicated it did not have the figures 
opposing counsel argued it had in closing arguments. See, Tr. at p. 484. 
The Plaintiffs argue this Court cannot find the Nielsens performed any of the terms 
of the Oral Agreement since such a finding would be clearly erroneous and not in 
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conformity with the Nielsens' own testimony. Opening Brief at p. 30. However, this 
argument flies in the face of the evidence at trial, whereat the Nielsens' asserted the 
existence of the Oral Agreement and testified to the terms as well as the Wilbergs. In 
sum, the Plaintiffs fall short of overcoming the trial court's conclusion the existence of 
the Oral Agreement, particularly in light of all the evidence in support of the Judgment 
and the trial court's ability to afford the evidence particular weight in its findings. 
IV. THE STATUTE IS UNAMBIGUOUS. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently upheld, "[a]s we have so often said, when 
interpreting a statute, we look first to the statute's plain language." Arnold v. Grigsby, 
2009 UT 88, t 19, 225 P.3d 192 citing Evans v. State. 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998). 
This Court has held, "[w]hen we construe a statute, we first explore its plain language 
and use other modes of interpretation only if the language contains ambiguities." DeLand 
v. Uintah County, 945 P.2d 172, 174 (Utah App., 1997) citing Gull Lab., Inc. v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 936 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah Ct.App.1997). Deland continues, "Unless a 
literal reading would render the statute's wording unreasonably inoperable or confusing, 
we accord the wording its usual and accepted meaning and do not look beyond plain and 
unambiguous language to ascertain legislative intent." Id. quoting US Xpress, Inc. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 886 P.2d 1115, 1117 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
Legislative intent is discerned by the statute's plain language. LPI Services v. 
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McGee, 2009 UT 41,1] H,215P.3d 135 citing Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 2007 UT 42, U 46, 164 P.3d 384. LH continues as 
follows: 
"We read the plain language of the statute as a whole[ ] and interpret its 
provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related 
chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, \ 17, 66 P.3d 592. When the plain 
meaning of the statute can be discerned from its language, no other 
interpretive tools are needed. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster/Church of Jesus 
. Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2007 UT 42, lj 47, 164 P.3d 384. However, "a 
court should not follow the literal language of a statute if its plain meaning 
works an absurd result." Savage v. Utah Youth Village, 2004 UT 102, f 18, 
104 P.3d 1242. "[I]f the language is ambiguous, the court may look beyond 
the statute to legislative history ... to ascertain the statute's intent." 
Martinez, 2007 UT 42, % Al, 164 P.3d 384. 
The Utah Supreme Court has determined "ambiguous" to mean capable of two or 
more plausible meanings. Alf v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 
(Utah, 1993); see also Epperson v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 949 P.2d 779, 783, fn. 6, 
(Utah App., 1997). However, ambiguity does not arise simply because one party seeks to 
endow differing interpretations according to his or her own interests. Id. 
The statute at issue herein states the following: 
(2) A qualified landowner may require the qualified adjoining landowner to 
pay for 1/2 of the cost of the fence if: (a) the fence is or becomes a partition 
fence separating the qualified landowner's land from that belonging to the 
qualified adjoining landowner; (b) the cost is reasonable for that type of 
fence; (c) that type of fence is commonly found in that particular area; and 
(d) the construction of the fence is no more expensive than the cost for 
posts, wire, and connectors. 
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UT. CODE ANN. § 4-26-5.1 (2). The statute continues, "[i]f the qualified adjoining 
landowner refuses, the qualified landowner may maintain a civil action against the 
qualified adjoining landowner for 1/2 of the cost of that portion of the fence." UT. CODE 
ANN. § 4-26-5.1 (3). Further, "[t]he cost of the maintenance of the fence shall also be 
apportioned between each party based upon the amount of land enclosed." UT. CODE 
ANN. §4-26-5.1(4). 
In the instant case, the Opening Brief is crowded with addenda for this Court's 
review in determining the Legislature's intent behind UT. CODE ANN. §4-26-5.1. 
However, the Legislature's intent is unnecessary as the statute's plain language is 
unambiguous and evidence outside the record on appeal should not be considered. See, 
State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, f 7, 974 P.2d 279 (An appellate court's "review is ... limited to 
the evidence contained in the record on appeal."). 
In determining that the parties contracted around the provisions of UT. CODE ANN. 
§ 4-26-5.1, the trial court simply upheld the terms of the Oral Agreement, which was the 
Wilbergs would bear the cost of the South Fence and the Nielsens would bear the cost of 
the North Fence. The trial court then determined future maintenance according to the 
plain language of the statute. UT. CODE ANN. § 4-26-5.1 (2) is not required to be applied 
to all cases, or else it would have included "shall" in place of "may". 
However, the trial court indicated the difficulty with this case was that the issue 
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was not about the total of acreage enclosed, it was about the fences at issue not meeting. 
Tr. at p. 491. The trial court indicated it had two (2) separate fences to look at and would 
v 
take the total amount of what the Nielsens own since that would be the amount being 
protected by the North Fence. Id. The trial court stated, "[t]hey're two separate fences 
and the statute can only be applied by following that formula for both fences. That's the 
only way it makes any sense." Tr. at p. 492. The trial court stated its understanding and 
reading of the statute meant that if a fence is protecting one landowner substantially more 
because there is a larger herd putting pressure on the fence, then it is fair for the larger 
landowner to pay a larger proportion of the fence cost. Tr. at pp. 495-496. Thus, the trial 
court determined its formula as follows: 
Isn't it possible for me simply to take a look at the amount enclosed in the 
Wilberg property on the north, compare that to the amount enclosed in the 
Nielsen property and determine then that that is the apportionment for the 
north fence? Do the same thing and say what is the amount of property 
owned by the Wilbergs on the south, determine that that then needs to be 
compared with the amount of the Nielsen property and that would be the 
apportionment on the south, for the south fence? And those are your two 
numbers. 
Tr. at p. 483. 
UT. CODE ANN. § 4-26-5.1 (2) does not automatically direct a qualified landowner 
to pay for one half (lA) the cost of the fence. The statute states "may" and not "shall", 
which lends a reading that, in certain circumstances, a qualified landowner could petition 
for one half the cost. It does not follow that, in every situation, a qualified landowner 
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would be entitled to half the cost of a fence. Further, it is unfair for a large property 
owner to be entitled to half the cost of a fence from a small property owner. In any event, 
the Oral Agreement negated the application of UT. CODE ANN. § 4-26-5.1 (2). 
The Plaintiffs first failed to raise the issue that the trial court should have 
apportioned the fences' linear boundary distance and not by the acreage of the parties' 
enclosed parcels. However, the Plaintiffs have also failed to demonstrate how this 
definition could be a plausible meaning according to the plain language of the statute, 
which reads, "[t]he cost of the maintenance of the fence shall also be apportioned 
between each party based upon the amount of land enclosed." UT. CODE ANN. § 4-26-5.1 
(4); see, Alf at 1274 and Arnold at f^ 19. It is noteworthy that this subsection of the statute 
does use "shall", thereby limiting a trial court's determination of this issue. The phrase 
"based upon the amount of land enclosed" does not indicate the distance of the linear 
boundary but plainly indicates the amount of land enclosed in the Wilberg property to the 
north compared to the amount enclosed in the Nielsen property and the amount of land 
enclosed by the Wilberg property to the south compared to the amount enclosed in 
Nielsen property. Such a formula is consistent with the plain reading of "the amount of 
land enclosed" by the fence. The Plaintiffs' reading of the statute is not supported by the 
plain reading and meaning UT. CODE ANN. § 4-26-5.1, which does not include any 
language regarding the linear distance of a fence. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' meaning of 
UT. CODE ANN. § 4-26-5.1 fails because it does not provide this Court with a plausible 
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meaning since the language the Plaintiff relies upon is gapingly absent from the statute 
itself. Alf at 1274. Further, ambiguity does not exist simply because the Plaintiffs seek to 
endow a differing interpretation according to their own interests. Id. 
The literal reading of UT. CODE ANN. § 4-26-5.1 does not render it unreasonably 
inoperable or confusing. Deland at 174. The trial court appropriately applied the plain 
meaning of the statute as it pertained to future maintenance of the North and South 
Fences and arrived to a just apportionment. Hence, this Court must accord the wording of 
the statute its usual and accepted meaning and should not look beyond the plain and 
unambiguous language to ascertain legislative intent. Id. As such, the legislative history 
included in the Opening Brief is unneeded, particularly since the plain meaning of UT. 
CODE ANN. § 4-26-5.1 does not work an absurd result. LPI at If 11. 
V. THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED THE FINDINGS 
AND CONCLUSIONS ARE AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF 
THE EVIDENCE. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held, "[w]hen reviewing a district court's findings of 
fact on appeal, we do not undertake an independent assessment of the evidence presented 
during the course of trial and reach our own separate findings with respect to that 
evidence." 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72,1f 75, 99 P.3d 801. "Rather, 
we endeavor only to evaluate whether the court's findings are so lacking in support that 
they are against the clear weight of the evidence." Id. citing Young v. Young, 1999 UT 
38,115,979R2d338. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has also held, "[w]hen parties appeal a court's fact-
sensitive use of its discretionary powers, they 'must successfully challenge the factual 
findings upon which the trial court's decision ... depended.'" United Park City Mines Co. 
v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, ^  37, 140 P.3d 1200 citing Chen v. 
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, n. 14, 100 P.3d 1177. This Court must also bestow due 
consideration to the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses, which is vital to the 
basis of this Court's repeated holdings that, "[findings of fact will not be set aside unless 
they are against the clear weight of the evidence and clearly erroneous." Glauser Storage, 
L.L.C. v. Smedley, 2001 UT App. 141, If 15, 27 P.3d 565 citing Coalville City v. 
Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1209-10 (Utah Ct.App.), cert, denied, 939 P.2d 683 (Utah 
1997). 
Thus, "[successful challenges to findings of fact must demonstrate to appellate 
courts first how the trial court found the facts from the evidence, and second why such 
findings contradict the weight of the evidence." State in the Interest of S.T., 928 P.2d 393, 
400 (Utah App., 1996) citing Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse, Inc., 
872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah App. 1994). Further, "[successful challenges can also 'induce 
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'" Id. citing State ex rel. 
N.H.B., 777 P.2d 487, 493 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989). 
In the instant case, the Plaintiffs argue the Judgment is against the clear weight of 
evidence at trial. While the Plaintiffs have set forth evidence in support of their 
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arguments on appeal, equally credible evidence exists to support the trial court's ultimate 
determinations in this matter. See, 438 Main Street at f^ 75. Furthermore, any burden by 
the Plaintiffs to overcome this appellate hurdle has not been met. This Court has been 
presented with evidence that only support the Plaintiffs' version of events. The Plaintiffs 
have completely ignored the evidence that supports the Judgment and have failed to 
challenge the trial court's findings or discretion that would render the Judgment fatal on 
appeal. Accordingly, this neglect and failure does not establish Judgment in this matter as 
against the clear weight of the evidence at trial and in fact further support the soundness 
of the Judgment. 
On appeal, this Court does not undertake an independent assessment of the 
evidence presented during the course of trial and reach its own separate findings with 
respect to that evidence. 438 Main Street at f75. The findings in this matter were made 
upon sound evidence and are not lacking in support. Id. The support for the Judgment is 
clearly articulated by the Statement of Facts herein. Thus, the Judgment is not against the 
clear weight of the evidence in this matter. Id. 
The nature of the Plaintiffs' challenge in this regard is a challenge to the trial 
court's fact-sensitive use of its discretionary powers and thus they must successfully 
challenge the factual findings upon which the trial court's decision depended, which the 
Plaintiffs have failed to do. United Park City Mines at Tf37. The Plaintiffs have further 
failed to adequately marshal the evidence by first demonstrating to this Court how the 
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trial court found the facts from the evidence and then by showing why such findings 
contradict the weight of the evidence. S.T. at 400. In this case, the Plaintiffs only argue 
the facts from a light most favorable to them, which is fatal in a fact sensitive challenge. 
Therefore, the Judgment in this matter is not against the clear weight of the evidence as 
the Plaintiffs' challenge does not induce a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made. Id. 
VL THE PLAINTIFFS INVITED ERROR. 
This Court has recently held, "a party cannot take advantage of an error committed 
at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error." Braun v. Nevada 
Chemicals, Inc., 2010 UT App. 188, T| 15, 236 P.3d 176 citing Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 
41, f 17, 164 P.3d 366. The invited error doctrine is based upon two (2) reasons: "[f]irst, 
it fortifies our long-established policy that the trial court should have the first opportunity 
to address the claim of error. Second, it discourages parties from intentionally misleading 
the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal." Id. citing State v. 
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 54, 70 P.3d 111. Accordingly, "[t]he invited error doctrine 
precludes an appellate court from considering an issue on appeal that was not only 
unobjected to in the trial court, but was in fact submitted by argument, thereby depriving 
the court of the opportunity to correct any error." Mack v. Utah State Dept. of Commerce, 
Division of Securities, 2009 UT 47, ]f 15, 221 P.3d 194 citing State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 
4, If 14, 128 R3d 1171. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has held, "parties are 'not entitled to both the benefit of 
not objecting at trial and the benefit of objecting on appeal.'" Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 
41, If 17,.164 P.3d 366 citing State v. King, 2006 UT 3, \ 13, 131 P.3d 202. Generally, for 
a party to be determined to have invited error, the party must have made an affirmative 
representation to the trial court. Id. at f^ 18. 
In the instant case, the Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred by determining the 
future maintenance contributions from each party. The Plaintiffs argue the trial court 
should have relied upon the linear boundary lines and not the acreage enclosed by the 
fences. However, even if the Plaintiffs are correct in this argument, they invited any error 
as a result due to the evidence submitted at trial by the Plaintiffs and lack of argument at 
that time. 
When asked about this issue at closing arguments at trial, opposing counsel was 
unable to show the trial court the language of the statute that would allow such a reading 
in support of her position that UT. CODE ANN. §4-26-5.1 intended the linear distance of 
the fence and not the amount enclosed by the fence. Tr. at pp. 481-482. The trial court 
plainly outlined its approach to this matter in determining apportionment, by stating the 
following: 
Isn't it possible for me simply to take a look at the amount enclosed in the 
Wilberg property on the north, compare that to the amount enclosed in the 
Nielsen property and determine then that that is the apportionment for the 
north fence? Do the same thing and say what is the amount of property 
owned by the Wilbergs on the south, determine that that then needs to be 
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compared with the amount of the Nielsen property and that would be the 
apportionment on the south, for the south fence? And those are your two 
numbers. 
Tr. at p. 483. The trial court asked opposing counsel whether it had the figures for the 
fence boundary between the parties, to which opposing counsel answered, "[y]ou do not 
have those figures." Tr. at p. 484. 
By submitting the evidence in this matter in the manner performed by the 
Plaintiffs and failing to submit any figures for the fence boundary between the parties, the 
Plaintiffs cannot now plead error on appeal. The Plaintiffs failed to submit the required 
evidence they now claim caused error; this strategy cannot now be turned around to the 
Plaintiffs' benefit on appeal. See, Braun at If 15. As already argued herein, the Plaintiffs 
first failed to argue this position before the trial court and thus this issue is unpreserved. 
Moreover, the Plaintiffs appear to have mislead the trial court so as to preserve a hidden 
ground for appeal. Id. The failure of the Plaintiffs at trial to attempt to rectify the trial 
court's approach to the future maintenance contributions without following the proper 
procedure for doing so cannot now be objected to on appeal when the Plaintiffs led the 
trial court into error, should error exist. Accordingly, this Court should decline to review 
the future maintenance contributions, as they have been appropriately determined at trial. 
/ / . • 
I I . ; • •  ' • 
II 
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CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, the Neilsens respectfully request this Court affirm the trial court 
in this matter and deny the challenges made by the Appellants in this matter. 
DATED THIS | 0 _ day of October, 2010 
Michael D. Olsen 
Attorney for Chris Nielsen and Sunny J. Neilsen 
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Addendum ~A~ 
Complaint dated January 3, 2006 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
•TOANE: PAPPAS WHITE #3445 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
10 West Main 
PO Box 754 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: 435-637-0177 
Facsimile: 435-637-0183 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CCW RANCH, an LLC, CLAY 
WILBERG and ROSS WILBERG, 
as members of said LLC, and 
individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CHRIS and SUNNY J NIELSEN, 
Defendants. 
COME now CLAY WILBERG and ROSS WILBERG and CCW RANCH, LLC, 
a Utah limited liability company, by and through their attorney, 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE, and hereby allege as follows: 
' 1. Plaintiff CCW RANCH, LLC, is a Utah limited liability 
company and is the owner of some of the cattle and all of the 
following described real property located in Emery County, State 
of Utah. Clay Wilberg and Ross Wilberg are two of the members 
of said limited liability company ,^ and also are owners of various 
S 
cattle and property interests affected by this matter. The real 
property which is the subject matter of this action is located 
in Emery County, State of Utah, and more particularly described 
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as follows: 
SW/4/SW/4 SE/4;ALS0 BEG SW C0R,NW/4,SEC 12,TWP 18 S,R 8 E;' 
TH E 68 RDS;N 17°16'E 185 FT;N 29°09'W 1030 FT/N 68°25'W 36 
RDS;S 71 RDS TO BEG.ALSO BEG N/4 COR;S 2640 FT;W 1320 FT;N 
490 FT;NE'LY 840 FT;W 250 FT;N 660 FT;E 240 FT;NE'LY TO SEC 
LINE;E 796 FT TO GEG. 298.96 ACRES. 
SE/4 NW/4;SW/4 NE/4,SEC 13,TWP 18 S,R 8 E. ALSO BEG SE 
COR,NW/4 NE/4;N 26.33 RDS/W 240 RDS; S 26.33 RDS;E 240 RDS 
TO BEG.ALSO BEG NW COR, NE/4 SW/4;S 1285 FT;N 89°33'39"E 
973.12 FT; N 89°29'56"E 1180.80 FT;N 89°18'31"E 548.25 FT;N 
89°22'17"E 918.22 FT;N 77°00'53/,E 417.38 FT TO E SEC LINE;N 
1191.20 FT M/L TO 1/4 LINE;W 3960 FT M/L TO BEG.ALSO BEG SE 
COR,NE/4 SE/4;N 35.50 FT;S 78°44'23"W 189.98 FT;E 155.93 FT 
TO BEG. 240.32 ACRES. 
2. The Defendants, CHRIS and SUNNY NIELSEN hereafter 
collectively know as NIELSENS, also own real property located in 
Emery County, State of Utah, and more particularly described as 
follows: 
BEG NE COR,NW/4 NE/4,SEC 13,TWP 18 S,R 8 E;S 879.95 FT;W 
3720 FT M/L TO E'LY BNDRY LINE OF HWY 10;NE'LY ALONG HWY 
10,930 FT M/L TO SEC LINE;E 3430 FT M/L TO BEG.ALSO E/2 
NE/4. 152.9 ACRES 
3. The NIELSEN property is a strip which runs through the 
WILBERG property and said neighbors share two property 
boundaries, namely, a north property boundary and a south 
property boundary to the NIELSEN* property as it bisects the 
WILBERG property, ** . ^ 
\ 
4. Said boundaries have had historical fences of long 
duration in place as markers of the property boundaries and said 
fences have been jointly maintained and owned by these adjacent 
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property owners for many years. 
5. The WILBERGS have historically repaired fences and in* 
recent years the NIELSENS have failed to repair their fences. 
6. Approximately eighteen (18) months ago, ROSS WILBERG 
initiated a telephonic communication with CHRIS NIELSEN in which 
it was agreed that the WILBERGS would build a new fence on the 
south boundary of the NIELSENS' property and the NIELSENS would 
build a new fence on the north boundary of the NIELSENS' 
property. In reliance on said agreement, ROSS WILBERG has 
constructed almost three thousand (3,000) lineal feet of new 
fence dividing the south boundary of the NIELSEN property from 
WILBERG property; however, the NIELSENS have refused, failed and 
neglected to construct any fence as agreed upon in said oral 
agreement. 
1. The NIELSENS occupy and utilize their property on a 
frequent basis and have seen the construction of the WILBERG 
portion of the agreed fence and have watched the WILBERGS rely 
on said agreement. 
8. Additionally, the historic, fence has not been 
maintained by the NIELSENS as required by Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 4-26-5. The NIELSENS havje allowed vegetation and trees 
to grow out of control and have failed to repair the fence when 
their trees have fallen across and damaged same. Additionally, 
the NIELSENS have trenched ditches in an inappropriate fashion 
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thereby burying the historic fence line and have failed to fix 
same when advised of the problem by the WILBERGS. 
9. The WILBERGS currently graze cattle on their property. 
The NIELSENS have often leased their property for the purpose of 
grazing cattle and/or other livestock and have used the property 
for livestock and agricultural purposes. To the best of the 
Plaintiffs' information and belief, the defendants declare the 
subject property as "Green Belt" and receive the tax advantages 
i 
;
 therefore. The parties are adjoining land owners pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, 4-26-5.1 and, in the event that the 
NIELSENS do not maintain the existing fence or construct the new 
fence, with or without an agreement, the WILBERGS are entitled 
to create the fence pursuant to said statute and attach a lien 
to the NIELSENS' property for the construction of same. 
10. At the current time, due to the NIELSENS' refusal to 
complete their portion of the verbal agreement and further based 
i i 
on the NIELSENS' failure to maintain the historic fence and 
further based upon the NIELSENS' failure to repair the damage 
inflicted by their improper trenching and their improper 
maintenance of trees and vegetatipn on their property, WILBERG 
cattle are currently entering th£ NIELSEN property through the 
NIELSEN north boundary. The cattle enter because the NIELSENS 
have failed to maintain their fences as outlined above. 
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11. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 4-26-5.1, the 
WILBERGS allege the cost per lineal foot of an adequate fence 
will be at least the sum of $8 plus per lineal foot. The 
NIELSENS have approximately 4,950 feet to construct in 
conformity with the oral agreement entered into by the parties 
or, alternatively the NIELSENS have approximately 4,950 feet to 
repair or replace pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 4-26-
5.1. 
12. Since the NIELSENS have failed to perform, the 
WILBERGS will obtain the services of an expert fencing 
construction company and will commence an immediate replacement 
of the fence and will seek damages in an amount to be more fully 
determined at the time of trial in this matter but which will be 
a minimum of $39,600 dollars. 
13. In the event that the NIELSENS fail to pay the 
construction company for the fence pursuant to Section 4-26-5.1, 
UCA, the WILBERGS request that this Court enter a judgment as a 
lien against the NIELSEN real property so that foreclosure may 
initiate upon same to pay for "the fencing pursuant to the 
statue. # 
14. The NIELSENS have commenced a small claims action in 
the Justice Court for Emery . County, Utah against only Ross 
WILBERG and Clay WILBERG, alleging that the NIELSENS are 
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entitled to a judgment for a sum certain, namely, $1,-261.3u for 
the trespass of what "'they define as "Wilberg" cattle. Wi::T;;RGS* 
have challenged the jurisdiction of that court to determine the 
respective interests of the parties in said real property and 
any damages that may be owed as a result of the actions of said 
parties. The new simplified rules of Civil Procedure of the 
Justice Court has created a situation in which the simplified 
Rules actually prohibit the filing of what would be a mandatory 
counterclaim under the regular Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
simplified rules direct the filing of the counterclaim as a 
separate district court action. The WILBERGS contend that the 
confusing and conflicting rules could result in the Justice 
Court entering a ruling or judgment in a hotly disputed property 
matter unless this District Court determines that it has 
exclusive original jurisdiction over matter alleged herein. 
14. The WILBERGS are entitled to an award of all court 
costs and attorney's fees herein. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray for relief as follows: 
1- That this Court determine that the Seventh Judicial 
District Court, in and for Emery ^County, Utah has original and 
exclusive jurisdiction over the -subject matter of this action 
and ill personam jurisdiction over- the parities hereto and that 
all issues which have arisen out of the relationship between the 
parties herein with respect to said real property described 
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herein and^tr. ioundary fenc&s associated therev;. •;: siiould be 
consolidated'L> this action pursuant to the Utah /;v..\cs of Civil 
Procedure. 
2. That the Court determine that the defendants have 
failed to maintain and act pursuant to their oral agreement with 
the Plaintiffs and that the Plaintiffs have been damaged thereby 
in an amount to be more specifically proven at the time trial 
but estimated to be approximately $40,000; and 
3- That the Court find that pursuant to Section 4-26-5.1, 
UCA, the Plaintiffs are entitled to commence the construction of 
an appropriate fence pursuant to the statute and reduce all 
expenses for the construction thereof to a lien against the 
NIELSEN property and that foreclosure commence thereon. 
4. That the Plaintiffs be awarded all court costs and 
attorney's fees herein. 
5- For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
just and equitable in the premises. 
DATED this 3rd day of January, 2006. 
<Z0ANE PAPPAS WHITE 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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